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Abstract
The eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 triggered a large flow
of migrant workers from the new member states to the UK and Ireland. This
paper analyzes the impact of this migration wave on the real wages in the source
countries. I consider the case of Lithuania, which had the highest share of emigrants
relative to its workforce among all ten new member states. Using data from the
Lithuanian Household Budget Survey and the Irish Census, I find that emigration
had a significant positive effect on the wages of men who stayed in the country, but
no such effect is visible for women. A percentage point increase in the emigration
rate increases the real wage of men on average by 1%. Several robustness checks
confirm this result.
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1

Introduction

If a high number of workers emigrate from a country, this should lead to wage increases
for those workers who stay behind. When in 2004 eight countries from central and eastern
Europe joined the Europen Union, this triggered a wave of migration from East to West,
as workers were able to earn much higher wages in Ireland and the UK than in Poland,
Latvia or Lithuania. The question is, whether this emigration wave had an impact on
the wages of stayers. An answer to this question can be important for other countries
that might join the European Union in the future and whose workers face the same kind
of incentives to emigrate. Examples are countries in the Balkan region, such as Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, etc.
In this paper, I test empirically the hypothesis, whether emigration leads to an increase
in the wages of stayers, exploiting the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004
as a natural experiment. I choose Lithuania for my analysis, as this country lost a high
share of its workforce due to emigration after 2004. From 2004 to 2007 around 9% of
Lithuanian workers registered for a work permit in Ireland and the UK. To identify the
impact of emigration on the wages of stayers, I use variation in emigration rates and real
wages across gender, education, experience and over time, which follows Borjas (2003)
and Mishra (2007). The data come from the Lithuanian household budget survey, the
Irish census, as well as the data on UK and Irish work permits.
Using a reduced-form approach, I find that an increase in emigration is associated with an
increase in real wages, but this only holds for certain groups of the workforce. While we
cannot see any statistically significant effect for the wages of women, I find a statistically
significant positive effect of emigration on the wages of men. When interaction terms are
included, it turns out that the effect is higher for unmarried men than for married men.
For a percentage point increase in the emigration rate, the real wages of men increase on
average by around 1%. For unmarried men, this effect is 1.5%, while for married men it
2
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is close to zero. The results are confirmed by a number of robustness checks. I also adress
the question of causality. While I can show that reverse causality is unlikely, it can be the
case that the results are driven by a third factor that leads to spurious correlations. In
the absence of suitable instruments, an interaction of time and region dummies accounts
for this problem, as they absorb factors that can have an impact on wages over time, such
as FDI inflows, trade or EU strucutral funds. Given the fact that the inclusion of those
fixed effects does not change the statistical significance and magnitude of the effects, this
indicates a causal relationship.
This paper contributes to the scarce literature on the wage effects of emigration. Mishra
(2007) analyzed in a careful empirical study the impact of emigration on wages in Mexico
over a time period of 30 years and found a significant positive effect. Batista (2007)
developed a dynamic macro model to analyze the contribution of capital flows and emigration to the convergence of Portuguese real wages to EU average after the country’s EU
accession. She only found a small contribution of emigration. Kaczmarczyk et al. (2009)
study the migration impact on Poland and Hazans & Philips (2009) analyze descriptively
the situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They find a higher number in vacancies
after 2004, lower unemployment and a higher wage growth. These developments occurred
at the same time as migration, but the authors do not attempt to establish a causal relationship.
My paper differs from those papers as it exploits the EU enlargement a natural experiment to show the short-run impact of emigration on the wages of stayers. From the
results we can see that this effect can be sizeable in the short run.
The paper is outlined as follows: section 2 describes the historical context of this study
and explains its theoretical underpinnings. In section 3, I describe the identification
strategy and the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the construction of the dataset.
Section 5 contains the results of the main estimation and robustness checks. Finally,
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section 6 concludes.

2
2.1

Historical Overview and Theoretical Considerations
Historical Overview

On May 1st 2004, the European Union was enlarged by ten new member states, of which
eight were former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This enlargement
posed considerable challenges to the old (EU-15) member countries. As the freedom of
movement for workers is one of the core principles of the European Union,1 workers from
the new member states would have been allowed to migrate freely and work in every
country of the European Union. Given the large wage differentials between the old and
new member states, some of the EU-15 countries feared negative consequences from the
immigration of cheap labor. Sinn (2004) calculated that around 5% of the population in
Central and Eastern Europe would migrate to the West after 2004. In countries with rigid
labor markets such as Germany and France, this would lead to decreasing wages of natives.
Moreover, as most Western European countries have generous welfare states, Sinn (2004)
expressed the fear of high fiscal burdens when migrants do not work but live on social
benefits. As a consequence, the EU-15 countries agreed on transitional arrangements
before the EU enlargement, allowing countries to close their borders for workers from
the new member states until 2011.2 Only Ireland, the UK and Sweden opened their
labor markets immediately. While Sweden noticed a comparably small inflow from 2004
onwards3 , Ireland and the UK became the major destinations for migrants from the
new member states. From 2004-2007, Ireland issued 391,618 work permits to nationals
from the accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The number of work
1
2
3

Art. 39 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
See Kahanec et al. (2009, p.4) for a description of the transitional arrangement.
Wadensjö (2007) reports around 19000 immigrants from the new EU member states to Sweden from
2004 to 2006.
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permits issued in the UK in the same time was 769,530.4 Some accession countries lost a
considerable share of their workforce due to migration. Figure 1 illustrates the number of
emigrants from 2004-2007 relative to the domestic workforce in 2003. Lithuania, Latvia
and Poland lost the highest share of their workers, whereas Hungary and the Czech
republic did not see big outflows of workers. The numbers reported in this figure reflect
an upper bound to migration. The actual losses to the workforce might be smaller, as
not all workers who received a work permit in Ireland and the UK, were actually part of
the workforce in the source countries. However, this figure shows that emigration led to
sizeable changes in labor supply in Central and Eastern Europe.

2.2

Theoretical Considerations

A standard textbook model of a labor market suggests that emigration is a negative
labor supply shock that leads to labor shortages, which result in upward pressure for
real wages. Considering one single labor market implicitly assumes homogeneity of the
workforce or, in other words, perfect substitutability of workers with different skills. This
assumption is implausible, as a labor market is usually highly fragmented and the degree of substitutability between different groups of workers depends on the proximity of
skills. Workers with the same degree of education are closer substitutes than those with
a different education. In a specialized economy, even within an education group, people
working in different industries are not perfect substitutes. For example, a solicitor cannot easily replace a physician and vice versa, even though both have a third-level degree.
If we take this heterogeneity of labor market participants and their various degrees of
substitutability into account, a theoretical model, such as the one proposed by Card &
Lemieux (2001), predicts that a group of workers that is affected by an emigration shock
experiences a higher effect on the wages of its own workers than any other group. As
4

Sources: CSO Ireland and UK Home Office.
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emigration did not occur equally to all skill groups, this variation can be exploited to
identify the effect of emigration on real wages.
In their models, Card & Lemieux (2001) and Borjas (2003) assume that capital in this
economy is fixed. If capital could fully adjust, migration would lead to capital outflows,
as a decrease in labor supply decreases the marginal product of capital. This was not
the case in Lithuania. Figure 6 shows that the capital stock in Lithuania was actually
growing from 2002 to 2006.5 In section 3.2, I will describe, how I account for those capital
flows in the empirical model.

3
3.1

Empirical Framework
Identification Strategy

To identify the impact of emigration on wages, I use variation in real wages and emigration rates across skill groups and over time. A skill group is defined by gender, education
and work experience. This definition follows the works by Borjas (2003), Ottaviano &
Peri (2006, 2008) and Borjas et al. (2008). The conjecture behind this idea is that workers
belonging to the same skill group compete in the same labor market. Those skill groups
in the workforce which saw large outflows of workers should have, on average, higher
increases in real wages than those groups who did not experience high outflows. This
is a feasible identification strategy in the case of Lithuania, as the data about educational attainment of emigrants is available from the Irish census. Their work experience
is not directly observable, but it can be calculated from the age and education of the
emigrants. The clustering of the workforce in education groups is based on the idea that
people within one education group are close substitutes in the labor market, whereas
5

I am aware of the possibility that capital could have increased even more in the absence of emigration.
However, I consider this effect to be negligible.
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people from different education groups are not. In other words, a bricklayer with lower
secondary education will hardly be able to replace an engineer with a third-level degree
and vice versa.
However, even within a particular education group, workers are not necessarily close substitutes if they differ in work experience, as skill formation does not end with education.
Furthermore, workers acquire job-specific skills at their workplace, so that workers with
the same education and a similar work experience are close substitutes on the labor market, whereas those with the same education but different levels of work experience are
not. To account for those different degrees of substitutability within workers of the same
education group, I cluster the workforce in three education and nine experience groups.
The education groups are lower secondary school and less, upper secondary school and
third-level degree. The experience groups are clusters of work experience intervals of five
years, i.e. 0-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years and so on. As the choice of those 5-year
intervals is arbitrary, I will also use 2-year and 10-year clusters for robustness checks.
Section A.1 explains the clustering method in detail.
Additional sources of variation commonly used in the migration literature are geography
and occupations.6 In the case of emigration, information about the distribution of emigrants across industries and cities in the source country is not available, as emigrants
are usually not included in national surveys such as the census or the HBS. On the other
hand, the Irish census data does not state what Lithuanian region the immigrants came
from or what occupation they had prior to migration. There is information available in
the Irish census about their current occupation in Ireland, but this allows no conclusion
about their previous occupation in Lithuania. As Kahanec et al. (2009, p. 20) show, immigrants from the new EU member states after 2004 often took up jobs in the receiving
countries for which they were actually over-qualified.

6

See, for example Altonji & Card (1991) and Friedberg (2001)
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3.2

Empirical Specification

The basic empirical specification essentially follows Friedberg (2001), who uses individuallevel data to investigate the impact of immigration in two-digit occupation categories on
real wages in Israel. Instead of occupations, I use worker skill groups as proposed by
Borjas (2003). As migration was triggered by a law change, I assume that it is exogenous
to changes in wages throughout the analysis.7
The basic empirical specification used throughout the paper is

i
i
= δmghjt + (Xghjt
)0 β + πt + educh + expj + (reg i × πt ) + εighjt ,
ln wghjt

(1)

i
where ln wghjt
denotes the log monthly real wage8 of individual i. mghjt is the emigration

rate of the skill group individual i belongs to. A skill group is composed of the following characteristics: gender g (g=male, female), education h (h= lower secondary, upper
secondary, third-level ) and experience group j (j= 0-4 years, 5-9 years,...,35-39 years,
40+ years). t is the relevant year of the cross-section (t=2002, 2003, 2005, 2006). The
emigration rate mghjt is a group variable that has the same value for all members of the
group in each year. Although all members of the group may not be affected by emigration to the same extent, it is plausible that they are affected in a similar way. Hence, I
expect the standard errors of the members of a particular group to be serially correlated.
This can lead to biased estimates, as reported standard errors can be much lower than
they in fact are.9 To overcome this bias, I cluster the standard errors on the level of
gender-education-experience-time cells.10 Throughout the whole analysis, I only consider
workers in the private sector. The argument for this is that the wage setting process in
the public sector can be influenced by factors that cannot be explained by competition,
7
8
9

10

I will discuss potential criticisms of this assumption in section 5.2.
Monthly wages are deflated by the Lithuanian HCPI. See table 1g) for the HCPI.
Angrist & Pischke (2009, ch.8) explain the bias resulting from clustered data and propose the
clustering of standard errors.
This makes an overall of 2 × 3 × 9 × 4 = 216 clusters
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such as political considerations or seniority pay plans, family size, etc.
The coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the average percentage change in the real
wage of a gender-education-experience cell, if the emigration rate of workers in this cell
changes by one percentage point.
i
Xghjt
is a vector of individual control variables (gender, marital status, a dummy for

urban areas, number of children).
(reg i × πt ) is an interaction term between a vector of year dummies (πt ) and a vector
of dummies for the county (reg i ) individual i lives in. The interaction accounts for unobservable changes in economic conditions across regions over time that may have an
influence on real wages. Examples are the inflow of EU structural funds, interregional
migration, FDI inflows or a change in the magnitude and composition of trade flows after
EU accession. The inclusion of this interaction helps to diminish the endogeneity and
omitted variable bias.
educh is a dummy for each education group h. It captures unobservable characteristics
that are common to the members of each education group and that do not change over
time. For example, workers with a third-level degree tend to work in white-collar occupations, whereas workers with a lower secondary education rather have blue-collar jobs.
The choice of those jobs influences their earnings, but we cannot observe the individual’s
occupation from the Lithuanian data. A similar selection pattern might occur among
workers with different levels of work experience. Within an occupation, older workers
might have different tasks than younger workers. This difference can affect their wages.
These time-invariant unobservable characteristics of different experience groups are captured by the experience group dummies expj .
All regressions are weighted with sampling weights given in the HBS. A sampling weight
is defined as the inverse of the probability that an observation is included in the sample.
The use of those weights becomes necessary, as some groups are over- and underrepre-

9
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sented in the sample compared to the population. This sampling design of the survey
would lead to biased estimates. The weighting of all regressions with those sampling
weights eliminates this bias.

4

Data and Descriptive Statistics

The core dataset used in this study is the annual Lithuanian Household Budget Survey,
which includes the characteristics and wages of stayers in Lithuania. The characteristics
of emigrants are taken from the Irish census data of the years 2002 and 2006. Finally, the
numbers of emigrants are extracted from the Irish “Personal and Public Service Numbers”
(PPS) and the “National Insurance Numbers” (NINo) from the United Kingdom. Those
data sources result in a pooled cross-sectional dataset covering the two years before EU
accession 2002, 2003, and the two years afterwards, 2005 and 2006. I deliberately omitted
the year 2004 from my analysis, as it is unclear, how many people actually emigrated in
2004. The registration numbers in the UK and Ireland in 2004 may reflect the fact that
workers had been living and working illegally in those countries before 2004, but only
applied for a work permit when Lithuania joined the EU.
The variables of interest throughout the whole study are real wages and emigration rates.
The real wages can be taken from the Lithuanian HBS. The emigration rates per skill
group are not directly observable and have to be calculated using information from different data sources. I take the skill distribution of Lithuanian emigrants from the Irish
census data. As there is no microdata about Lithuanian emigrants to the UK available
to me, I assume that the skill distribution of migrants to the UK is the same as the skill
distribution of migrants to Ireland. As the total inflows of Lithuanian workers, measured
from the numbers of work permits differ between Ireland and the UK, I assume that the
flows to the UK per skill group are directly proportional to the flows to Ireland. The
number of work permits in the UK relative to the number of work permits in Ireland in
10
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a given year describes this proportion. To obtain the emigration rates, the number of
emigrants in a skill group is divided by the number of people in the Lithuanian workforce,
who belong to the same skill group. In section A.2, I describe the calculation of emigration rates and discuss the necessary assumptions in detail. I also explain the cleaning of
the data in section A.3.
The following sections give a description about the data sources used in this study.

Lithuanian Household Budget Survey
The Lithuanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) is an annually conducted survey of
7000-8000 households. It includes individual characteristics of household members as
well as the income and expenditure of the household. The HBS is representative at the
individual level.
To match the Lithuanian data with the Irish census data, I restrict the sample to all
employees aged 18-64. The variables taken into consideration are income from employment of the household head and her personal characteristics, such as gender, marital
status, the number of children, etc. Self-employed workers are dropped from the sample,
as their income is decomposed in the HBS into several income categories which are not
easily traceable for most observations. The data on income is self-reported and could as
such be subject to misreporting. This does not seem to be the case for the Lithuanian
HBS. Table 1j) compares the average self-reported income for men and women from the
HBS with the average income reported by the Lithuanian statistical office, and we can
conclude that misreporting should not be an issue.
Table 1a) summarizes the properties of the HBS. Table 1c) indicates that the income
from employment for all groups has increased on average between 2002 and 2006.

11
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Irish Census
The Irish census was carried out in the years 2002 and 2006 and covers all people that
were present in the Republic of Ireland in the census night. The Central Statistics Office
(CSO) of Ireland provided a tabulation of all Lithuanians in the census of 2002 and 2006,
their educational attainment, gender and age. The Irish census data makes it possible
to calculate the gender-education-experience distribution of Lithuanian migrants, which
will be used to calculate the emigration rates from Lithuania for different education and
experience groups.11 Table 1b) illustrates the magnitude of the emigration wave from
Lithuania after EU accession.
The difference in the magnitude of Lithuanian migrant numbers between 2002 and 2006
is noteworthy. Despite the fact that I do not have precise information about the year,
in which the immigrants arrived, this difference confirms that most of the Lithuanians in
the Irish census came to Ireland around or after the country’s EU accession.
Tables 1d) and 1e) show the distribution of education groups in the Irish census and in
the Lithuanian HBS. The share of workers with a third-level and those with upper secondary education is lower among Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland than among stayers.
At the same time, the share of workers with lower secondary education is higher in among
immigrants in Ireland. This difference in the educational distribution indicates a pattern
of negative selection of migrants.

PPS and NINo numbers
As described above, the Irish census data can be used to determine the characteristics
of Lithuanian emigrants. However, the figures of the census are only a lower bound
to emigration numbers, as they are considerably lower than the figures reported by the
11

See section A.2
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worker registration schemes in the UK and Ireland. In the time from 2002 to 2007, 63,412
Lithuanians applied for a PPS number in Ireland and 90820 for a NINo number in the
UK. Figure 2 shows the migration pattern over time. Obviously, the large emigration
wave set in when Lithuania joined the EU in 2004.
All immigrants who wish to come to Ireland and take up legal employment are required
to apply for a PPS number. Hence, the PPS numbers capture the amount of all labor migrants coming to Ireland, no matter how long they actually stay in the country and what
type of job they are employed in. There is no obligation to de-register once a migrant
leaves Ireland. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the PPS numbers how long immigrants actually stay in Ireland and how many return to Lithuania. The NINo numbers in
the UK are equivalent to the PPS numbers in Ireland.12 The UK government introduced
an additional registration scheme for arriving workers from the new EU member states
(WRS). The data on migration flows from Lithuania to the UK are similar to those from
the NINo numbers, but they only cover the period from 2004 onwards. Hence, NINo
numbers are more suitable for my analysis, as they cover the whole time span from 2002.
The number of immigrants can generally be overstated in the PPS and NINo numbers,
as some Lithuanians might be registered in both countries. I will use the PPS and NINo
numbers as weights in the calculation of emigration rates in section A.2, taking into consideration that they are an upper bound to migrant numbers and may contain double
counts as well as workers who stayed abroad for a very short period in time, e.g. for a
summer job.

12

For further information about PPS and NINO numbers, see http://www.welfare.ie and
http://www.direct.gov.uk
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5

Estimation Results

5.1

Basic Results

I estimate the fixed-effect model in equation (1) with OLS, for which Table 3 (panel A)
shows the regression results. The basic results, including all private sector workers are
displayed in column (1). Controlling for observable and unobservable worker characteristics, I find a positive and statistically significant effect of emigration on real wages.
In economic terms, the coefficient of the emigration rate means that an increase in the
emigration rate of a certain gender-education-experience group by one percentage point,
increases the wages of this group on average by 0.66%. As we can see, men have on average higher earnings than women, the same holds for people living in an agglomeration13
and people who are married. The variable Children denotes the number of children under
16 living with the individual. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant, but
economically negligible, as every child decreases income from employment on average by
0.036%.
Within the population, different groups of the labor force may be affected differently by
emigration, for example men more than women, married people more than unmarried.
To account for different wage effects for men and women, I include interaction terms of
the emigration rate with the dummy for male (see table 3, column (2)). Furthermore, as
unmarried people tend to be more mobile than married people and might differ in unobservable characteristics, the wage effect might differ for married and unmarried people.
I account for this difference in table (3) column (3) with an additional interaction of the
emigration rate with the dummy for married. This allows me to analyze the wage effects
for four different groups: married women, unmarried women, married men, unmarried
men.
13

The agglomeration dummy equals 1 if the person lives in one of the five largest cities of Lithuania
(Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, Panevezys) and zero otherwise.
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Table 4 (panel A) reports the marginal effects of a 1-percentage-point increase in the
emigration rate on the real wages of different groups. As we can see, there is a statistically significant positive effect for men. For every percentage point increase in their
emigration rate, their real wage increases by around 1.2%. For women, we cannot see a
statistically significant effect. A reason for the different effect between men and women
might be the fact that emigrant women might actually not be part of the Lithuanian
labor force. In case they did not emigrate out of the workforce, it is not surprising that
we cannot find evidence for wage increases, as their outflow is not a negative labor supply
shock. Another explanation can be that women work in industries that are not affected
by emigration, so that no wage effect is visible.14 The obvious gender pay gap15 indicates
such a self-selection behavior.
Considering the different effects for married and unmarried people, we can see that there
is no visible effect for women. For men, we can see a sizeable difference in the effects of
emigration on their real wages between unmarried and married men. At the same time,
unmarried men saw their real wages increase on average by 1.4% for every percentage
point increase in the emigration rate, while for married men, this effect is close to zero.
Despite the fact that the effect for married men is statistically highly significant, the size
of the effect is economically negligible.
The difference in the wage effect for married and unmarried men can have a number of
reasons. Of course, there are no distinct labor markets for both groups. The higher wage
effect for unmarried men might be driven by observable and unobservable characteristics.
Unmarried men are more flexible and have lower moving costs, which gives them a higher
bargaining power towards their employers. They can use the possibility of emigration as
a credible threat. Moreover, unmarried men are on average younger than married men. If
14

15

Around 40% of all female workers are employed in the public sector, while the share of male workers
is only 20%. Source: Statistics Lithuania
See the coefficients for the male dummy in table 3, column (3). Even in the absence of migration,
men earn on average more than women.
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younger workers have higher wage increases than older workers, this translates into higher
wage increases for unmarried men.16 Another unobservable characteristic could be the
type of profession married and unmarried people choose. Married people might be more
conservative and choose jobs that give them security but are not subject to high wage
increases, whereas unmarried men might rather pick jobs that are riskier but experience
higher wage increases.

5.2

Robustness Checks

5.2.1

Do the Results Suffer from Reverse Causality?

As the results in section 5.1 are derived using OLS, they measure a correlation between
emigration and wages. However, a causal interpretation of emigration on wages is only
possible, if we can exclude reverse causality. In our case, reverse causality would mean
that wages drive emigration. This is certainly possible and would lead to biased estimates.
As I cannot entirely exclude reverse causality, it is important to understand the direction
of the bias. As it turns out, reverse causality leads to a downward bias in the estimates
of the parameter δ in equation (1). As a consequence, the coefficients obtained in the
regressions in section 5.1 reflect a lower bound to the actual effects, so that the effect is
at least as great as δ. This can be shown as follows:
Take a simplified version of the model in equation (1),

ln w = δm + u,

(2)

where u is an error term. In case emigration drives wages, the coefficient δ should be
positive, as stayers become a more scarce resource because of higher emigration, which
16

As the variation of emigration rates and wage changes across experience groups is central to the
identification strategy, I do not test for a difference in wage increases for workers of different age.
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leads to an increase in their wages. On the other hand, if we regress emigration rates on
wages, the regression becomes

m = γ ln w + v,

(3)

with v being the error term. The direction of the bias then depends on the sign of the
coefficient γ. If wages were driving emigration, I would expect a negative relationship
between wages and emigration, so that γ < 0: the lower the wages are, the higher the
number of emigrants. If those two effects work at the same time, we can add equations
2 and 3. Solving for ln w, we get

ln w =

δ−1
u+v
m+
.
1−γ
1−γ

As we can see from this equation, δ >

δ−1
,
1−γ

(4)

which is valid as γ < 0, so that the

estimate of the coefficient δ in equation (1) is a lower bound to the effect of emigration
on wages.
5.2.2

Are the Results Driven by a Third Factor?

Even if reverse causality is not an issue, the correlations found in table 3 may not lead
to a causal interpretation, if there is a third factor that drives migration and wages at
the same time. In case of the EU eastern enlargement, this situation is likely. The accession of Lithuania did not only trigger a wave of emigration, the country could also
benefit from a deeper trade integration, increased FDI inflows, domestic investment and
the inflows of EU structural funds. Economic theory implies that those factors, trade
and capital inflows, increase labor demand, which translates into higher wages. Hence,
the correlation obtained from the OLS estimates might be spurious and does not lead
to any conclusion about causality. One way to overcome this problem would be the use
17
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of instrumental variables. However, in the context of the European enlargement it is
difficult to find suitable instruments, which are correlated with the emigration rate and
not correlated with wages, as the EU accession changed the economic conditions from
one day to another, so that most variables will be correlated with wage changes.
Another problem that arises in OLS regressions when we do not control for additional
variables that drive wages, is omitted variable bias. Without the use of instrumental
variables, this bias cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be reduced, either by the
inclusion of appropriate fixed effects or by the inclusion of observable control variables,
which have an effect on wages, such as FDI or trade. In equation (1) and in all subsequent
robustness checks, I include an interaction between a set of region dummies and a set of
time dummies. These interactions absorb changes in wages across regions over time and
as such, they absorb the variation that is caused by changes in labor demand over time.
The rationale behind this is that demand factors like inflows of FDI and EU structural
funds, as well as trade flows, have a different effect on every region and on the wage level
in this region.
As a robustness check, I omit the interaction region*year from equation (1) and include
log(FDI stocks), log(Exports) and log(GDP per capita) in the regression.17 Those three
variables are measured at the county level and denominated in 2005 Litas. Panel B of
table 3 reports the results for these regressions. None of the included variables (FDI,
exports and GDP) is statistically significant at the 5% level. In panel B of table 4 we
can see the marginal effects of emigration on wages. Compared to the results in panel A,
the results in panel B have the same statistical significance and magnitude. The question
arises, which method is more helpful in reducing the omitted variable bias. As the interaction terms region*year absorb all the developments that affect the wages differently
across regions over time, this method reduces the bias more than the inclusion of the
three observable variables. Because the data on some variables, such as the inflow of
17

Source: Lithuanian statistical office.
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EU strucural funds at a regional level, is not readily available, the omitted variable bias
should be greater in the latter case.

5.2.3

Did the Migrants Emigrate out of Unemployment?

The increased mobility for Lithuanian workers after EU accession made it also possible
for unemployed people to emigrate and look for work in Ireland and the UK. From the
Irish census, I do not have any information about the previous employment status of the
migrant workers. As we can see in table 1i), unemployment fell from 13.8% in 2002 to
5.6% in 2006. This decline can be due to a favourable economic climate,18 as well as due
to emigration. Emigration can affect unemployment mainly through two channels: 1)
unemployed people emigrate, 2) unemployed people take up jobs of people who emigrate.
I consider the first channel as unrealistic, as the skill requirements in Ireland and the
UK are on average higher than in Lithuania, so that it is less likely for someone who
is unemployed in Lithuania to find a job abroad. Moreover, immigrant workers from
other EU member states only become eligible for social benefits in the UK and Ireland
after working there for one year.19 Thus, Lithuanian workers did not have an incentive
to emigrate into unemployment and live on social benefits. The second channel could
play a more important role than the first one and can as such be part of the story, why
wages increase when workers emigrate. However, if unemployed workers replace workers
who emigrated and receive the same wage, this would at maximum downward-bias the
estimates obtained in section 5.1, so that the effect of emigration would be higher in
absence of this job replacement mechanism.

18
19

GDP growth from 2002-2006 was between 7 and 10%, see table 1k).
Source: Irish Welfare Office, UK Department of Work and Pensions.
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5.2.4

Are the Results Influenced by Immigration from Other Countries?

Wages are just one possible channel, through which the labor market can adjust to an
emigration shock. Another adjustment channel is immigration from other countries. If
domestic workers who emigrant are replaced by immigrant workers with the same skills,
this should leave wages unchanged. As we can see in table 1h), Lithuania saw in fact
an increase in migration from 2002 to 2006. However, if we break the immigration down
by country, we can see that the number of immigrants from the former Soviet Union
and other countries remains the same, whereas the number of Lithuanian immigrants
increases. This reflects the fact that many Lithuanians emigrated for a short period in
time and finally returned to their home country. Even though I cannot directly control
for return migration,20 I accounted for this fact in the calculation of emigration rates in
section A.2, so that immigration from other countries and return migration should not
bias the estimates.

5.2.5

Do the Emigration Rates of other Skill Groups Have an Effect?

The wages of a certain skill group do not only depend on the labor supply of this particular
skill group, but also on the labor supply of other skill groups. If different skill groups
enter the aggregate production function of an economy as separate labor inputs, a negative
labor supply shock to one cell leads to a decreasing marginal product of all the other cells
and therefore lowers wages. To account for this interdependence between different skill
groups, I augment the specification in equation (1) as follows:

i
wghjt
= δmghjt +

X

δghkt mghkt +

k6=j

+
20

i
(Xghjt
)0 β

X

δgljt mgljt

l6=h

+ πt + educh + expj + (reg i × πt ) + εighjt ,

(5)

The HBS does not contain information about the number of return migrants by skill group.

20

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper539

20

Elsner: Does Emigration Benefit the Stayers? The EU Enlargement as a

where mghkt are the emigration rates of all other experience groups within education
group j. mghkt are the emigration rates of the same experience group j but a different
education group h.21 Table 5a) reports the results for the regressions of equation (5).
The sign and significance of the coefficients for the different groups are the same as in the
basic model. The effect of emigration on the real wages of men comes out slightly smaller
than in section 5.1, but the robustness check generally confirms the previous results.

5.2.6

Do the results depend on the calculation of skill groups?

So far, I have controlled for a worker’s experience by including dummies for experience
groups. In the literature, work experience often enters the econometric model as a continous variable.22 This makes it possible to account for diminishing marginal returns to
work experience by including a squared term. The empirical specification for this is

i
i
wghjt
= δmghjt + (Xghjt
)0 β + πt + educh + expi + (expi )2 + (reg i × πt ) + εighjt ,

(6)

where expi is the work experience of individual i. The results are displayed in table 5b)
and do not differ a lot from the ones in section 5.1.
In section 5.1, the workforce was clustered in 5-year work experience groups under the
assumption that within an experience group, workers are perfect substitutes. The choice
of those intervals, though widely used in the literature, is purely arbitrary. To check,
whether the results are driven by the way the skill groups are clustered, I re-run specification (1), using 2-year and 10-year experience groups. The results can be seen in
tables 5d) and 5e). In terms of sign and significance, the coefficients are equivalent to the
ones obtained in section 5.1. The marginal effects of the 2-year cells are smaller than for
21

22

Due to multicollinearity issues, it is not possible to include the emigration rates from all other
gender-education-experience groups.
See, for example, Chiswick (1978).
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the 10-year cells. This difference can be due to the fact that 2-year cells allow for more
variation in real wages and emigration rates across skill groups.

5.2.7

Interaction year*education

When Lithuania joined the EU in 2004, this accession did not only trigger an emigration wave, but the country also got access to EU structural funds and received higher
FDI inflows. These factors can increase labor demand and as such have an impact on
wages. In the basic specification of equation (1), I attempted to capture those factors
by including time fixed effects and an interaction of region and time dummies. The time
dummies capture unobservable effects on the average wages of all workers in a given
year. The interaction region*year captures unobservable heterogeneous drivers of wage
changes across regions over time. However, neither the time dummies nor the interaction
accounts for heterogeneous changes in wages across education groups over time. The EU
structural funds benefited particularly sectors that employ low-skilled workers, such as
the construction sector. In this case, the inflow of structural funds would have a greater
impact on the wages of low-skilled workers than on the ones of high-skilled workers. These
unobservable heterogeneous wage changes for different education groups over time can be
captured by an interaction of the time dummies with the dummies for education groups.
As we can see in table 5c), the effect of emigration on the real wages is slightly smaller,
but in terms of sign and significance, this robustness check confirms the findings from
section 5.1.

6

Conclusion

In this paper I exploit a natural experiment to estimate the impact of emigration on
stayers. I choose Lithuania for my case study, which lost a high share of its workforce
due to emigration after the country’s EU accession. The main result in this paper is that
22
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there is a positive effect of emigration on the wages of stayers. However, this effect is not
significant for all groups of the workforce. While the wages of men increased significantly
due to emigration, I cannot find such an effect for women. The use of interaction terms
revealed that the increase in wages was higher for unmarried men than for married men.
These results are plausible, as unmarried men are more flexible than married men, which
gives them a higher likelihood to emigrate. If this translates into a higher bargaining
power, their wages will increase more than the wages of other groups.
The results turn out to be robust subject to a number of robustness checks. In the absence
of appropriate instruments, the question of a causal relationship between emigration and
wages can only be answered indicatively. Given that the EU accession was an exogenous
event and given that we control appropriately for other factors that might influence
migration and wages, the causality of emigration increasing wages seems likely.
While in this study I was only able to account for capital flows using fixed effects, it would
be interesting to investigate the contribution of capital flows to the changes in wages after
2004. For such a study, a structural model such as in Ottaviano & Peri (2006, 2008) is
needed. This could be the subject of future research.
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A

Data

A.1
A.1.1

Clustering: Education-Experience Groups
Education Groups

The Lithuanian education system offers a variety of educational tracks and degrees.23 I
aggregate the different education levels into three broad education groups for two reasons:
Firstly, the Irish census only includes five different education groups (primary and lower,
lower secondary school, upper secondary school, third-level - no degree and third-level
degree), so that a matching of the educational attainment of emigrants and stayers is
only possible if broader education groups are considered. Secondly, in some cases different
educational tracks in Lithuania lead to comparable degrees. For example, the basic school,
which students finish at the age of 16, and the stage I of vocational training. Both of
those tracks lead to a basic school leaving certificate. Thus, students holding either of
those comparable degrees can be seen as close substitutes on the labor market and should
be equally affected by the emigration of workers with comparable characteristics. Tables
1d) and 1e) show the distribution of the education levels in the Lithuanian HBS as well
as in the Irish census.
I define the education groups as follows: Lower secondary school and less, upper secondary
school and third-level degree.

Lower Secondary School and Less People with 10 years of schooling or less. As
the Lithuanian HBS contains very few observations with primary school education or
less, I merge these with the category lower secondary school. Therefore, in terms of the
Lithuanian classification, this category includes highschool dropouts, workers who only
finished primary school, those with a basic school leaving certificate (usually obtained at

23

http://www.euroguidance.lt provides an overview of the Lithuanian education system.
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the age of 16) and those who pursued stage I of vocational training, which also leads to a
basic school leaving certificate. In the Irish census, this group consists of primary school
and less and lower secondary school.

Upper secondary school This category includes all workers having a degree higher
than a basic school leaving certificate (i.e. at least 11 years of schooling), but do not
hold a degree that would allow them to enter a masters’ programme at a university in
Lithuania or abroad. The dominant degree in this category is the Lithuanian A-level,
usually obtained at the age of 18. The other degrees of this category are stages II, III
and IV of vocational training and certificates from non-university third-level institutions.
In the Irish census, this category contains all workers with an upper secondary school
degree or a third-level education that does not lead to a university degree.

Third-level degree All workers with at least 15 years of schooling and a degree that
enables them to apply for a university masters’ degree in Lithuania or abroad. Workers
with a masters’ or a PhD degree are also included here.

A.1.2

Experience Groups

Within each education group, I cluster the workforce by groups of work experience.
Following Borjas (2003), workers of five consecutive years of work experience form one
experience group: workers with 0-4 years of experience, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, etc. up to
the group 40+ years. The work experience is not directly observable from the Irish census data, but can be calculated. Assuming that people enter the labor market right after
completion of their education, the work experience is calculated according to the formula
experi = agei − educi − 6, where agei is the age of individual i, educi is the duration of
her highest education individual i has finished and children usually enter school at the
age of 6. educi equals 10 years for workers with lower secondary school, 12 years with
29
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upper secondary school and 15 years with a third-level degree.

A.2

Calculation of Emigration Rates

Although the number of emigrants in each education-experience cell is not directly observable, the available data allows me to construct sensible measures of emigration numbers
for different skill groups. The idea behind the calculation is the following: take the
gender-education-experience distribution from the Irish census and weight it with the
corresponding numbers of workers who applied for PPS and NINo numbers in Ireland
and the UK. By dividing the calculated emigrant number of a certain gender-educationexperience cell by the number of people in Lithuania with the same characteristics, we
obtain the emigration rates.
The calculation of emigration rates requires three assumptions about the emigrants’
gender-skill distribution: 1) the distribution is the same in the UK and in Ireland. 2)
The distribution in 2002 is the same as in 2003, and 3) the distribution in 2005 is the
same as in 2006.
The first assumption implicitly claims that no sorting behavior among migrants between
the two destinations Ireland and the UK could be noticed. This assumption is backed
by the recent literature on immigration to Ireland and the UK. When we compare the
descriptive statistics of the studies by Barrett & Duffy (2008, p.605) for Ireland and Dustmann et al. (2009, p.23) for the UK, the educational distribution of immigrants from the
A8 countries24 who came after 2004, looks fairly similar (see table 2). Hazans & Philips
(2009) analyze the occupational distribution of Lithuanians in Ireland and the UK. On
the one hand, there is a difference in the sectors that employ Lithuanian immigrants in
both countries. In the UK, around 30% of Lithuanian immigrants work in agriculture,
24

A8 countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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whereas in Ireland this share is only 5%. This result could lead to the conclusion that
migrants in the UK differed in their skills from those in Ireland. On the other hand,
the same study shows that in both countries around 80% of Lithuanian migrants work
in sectors that typically employ less-skilled workers, such as construction, health, trade,
manufacturing, hotels and restaurants and agriculture. This indicates the absence of sorting behavior, so that it is reasonable to assume that the skill distribution of Lithuanian
immigrants is the same in Ireland and the UK.
Assumptions 2) and 3) are reasonable as the education distribution among Lithuanian
emigrants in Ireland did not change significantly from 2002 to 2006, even though the
number of migrants is nine times higher in 2006. As we can see in table 1e), the share
of immigrants with a third-level degree is slightly lower in 2006. At the same time, the
share of those with lower secondary education is higher, but both distributions - 2002
and 2006 - do not differ a lot. Taken together, these three assumptions make it possible
to extrapolate the skill distribution given in the Irish census to the UK and to the years
that are not covered in the Irish census, 2003 and 2005. This allows me to present a
more realistic picture of the size and impact of migration flows than we would get by
only using the Irish data for 2002 and 2006 without extrapolating. In the robustness
checks in section 5.2, I drop those assumptions. We will see that this has an impact on
the magnitude, but not on the sign and statistical significance of the wage effects.

For the calculation of the number of emigrants for each gender-education-experience cell
in the years 2002 and 2006, I use the number of Lithuanians in the Irish census of the
same year and multiply it with a weighting factor, which accounts for the migration flows
to the UK. For the years 2003 and 2005, I additionally weight the calculated number with
the PPS and NINo numbers of those years.
Let xtghj denote the number of people in the Irish census of gender(g)-education(h)-
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experience(j) cell at time t. For t = (2002, 2006), the calculated number of emigrants
is
t
Mghj

=

xtghj



N IN Ot
1+
,
P P St

(7)

t
where Mghj
is the calculated number of emigrants in cell ghj in year t. N IN Ot and

P P St are the NINo and PPS numbers issued to Lithuanians in year t. The first term in
parentheses (1 in this case), accounts for the fact that I consider the raw migrant numbers
in the census 2002 and 2006 for Ireland. The second term in parantheses,

N IN Ot
,
P P St

is a

weighting factor for the extrapolation of the migrant skill distribution of the Irish census
to the UK. If, for example, in 2006 the number NINo applications is twice the number
of PPS applications, this factor is 2. Table 1e) displays the figures of PPS and NINo
numbers issued between 2002 and 2006.
For the year 2003, I take the number of Lithuanian migrants in cell ghj of the year 2002
and weight it with the PPS and NINo numbers of 2003. This results in

2003
Mghj
P P S2003
P P S2002

=

x2002
ghj



P P S2003 N IN O2003
+
P P S2002
P P S2002


.

(8)

weights the number of migrants in the Irish census in 2002 with the change in PPS

numbers from 2002 to 2003. Suppose the number of Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland
was 30% higher in 2003 than in 2002. Then

P P S2003
P P S2002

= 1.3.

N IN O2003
P P S2002

accounts for the

change in PPS numbers, as well as for the difference in migration flows to the UK and
Ireland in 2003.25
The calculation of the number of emigrants in 2005 is analog the one of 2003:

2005
Mghj

25

=

x2006
ghj



P P S2005 N IN O2005
+
P P S2006
P P S2006


.

(9)

N IN O2003
P P S2002

O2003
actually consists of two factors: NPIN
P S2003 , which accounts for the size of migrant flows
P P S2003
to the UK relative to Ireland and P P S2002 , accounting for the change in migration flows to Ireland
from 2002 to 2003. By multiplication of those two terms, P P S2003 cancels out.
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For my econometric analysis, emigration rates are more relevant than absolute emigrant
numbers, as the coefficient δ in equation (1) can then be interpreted as a quasi-elasticity.
An increase in the emigration rate of one percentage point would then increase the real
wage by δ percent.
The emigration rate mghjt for cell ghj in year t is

mghjt

t
Mghj
P
,
=
pghijt

(10)

i
t
denotes the number of emigrants calculated in equations (7) to (9). The
where Mghj

denominator of equation 10 is the number of people in year t living in Lithuania and belonging to cell ghj. Due to the fact that I do not have data covering the entire Lithuanian
population, I have to calculate the number from the HBS. The HBS is representative at
the household level, so that I can calculate the total number of Lithuanians in cell ghj
by summing up the sampling weights pghijt 26 over all observations i that are in cell ghj
in year t.

A.3

Data Cleaning

Additional to the data cleaning mentioned in section 4, I made the following changes in
the respective datasets:

Irish census
• Dropped observations if age is less than 18 years
• Calculated emigration numbers are rounded to full digits

26

The sampling weight pghijt is the inverse probability that observation i is included in the sample.

33

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

33

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 539 [2011]

Lithuanian HBS The following observations were dropped:
• Disposable income less than 0
• Socioeconomic status "pensioner" or not reported
• Less than 18 and more than 64 years old
• Workers, whose income is neither from employment nor self-employment
• Workers who own a farm or are self-employed

34
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Year
a) Number of observations in the Lithuanian HBS, employees aged 18-64
All workers
Men
Women
b) Number of observations in the Irish census, employees aged 18-64
All workers
Men
Women
c) Mean private sector income from employment in Litas, deflated
by the HCPI. Source: own calculations from the Lithuanian HBS
All workers
Men
Women
d) Distribution of education in the Lithuanian HBS
lower secondary
upper secondary
third-level
e) Distribution of education of Lithuanians in the Irish census
lower secondary
upper secondary
third-level
f) Numbers of work permits (PPS and NINo).
Sources: Irish Department of Social and Family Affairs
UK Department for Work and Pensions.
PPS
NINo
g) Lithuanian HCPI, 2005=100, source: Eurostat
h) Immigrants to Lithuania (by nationality), source: Statistics Lithuania
Lithuanian
Belarussian, Russian, Ukrainian
Other
Total
i) Unemployment rate in Lithuania, source: Statistics Lithuania
j) Average monthly gross wage, private sector workers, in LTL
Statistics Lithuania
Men
Women
Lithuanian HBS (calculated average) Men
Women
k) real GDP growth, year-on-year, source: Statistics Lithuania

2002

2003

2005

2006

3950
2322
1628

4136
2411
1725

4042
2426
1616

3874
2314
1560

1904
987
917

-

-

21779
12300
9479

1084
1139
906

1142
1216
905

1339
1405
1107

1533
1628
1249

9%
68.8%
22.2%

10.6%
69.0%
20.4%

10.9%
67.5%
21.6%

9.9%
67.5%
22.6%

16.7%
63.4%
19.9%

-

-

20.4%
62.2%
17.4%

2709
1430

2394
3140

18680
10710

16017
24200

97.334

96.291

100

103.788

809
2478
1823
5110

1313
1915
1500
4728

4705
874
1210
6789

5508
1337
900
7745

13.8%

12.4%

8.3%

5.6%

1173
998
1185
940

1227
1029
1252
988

1420
1167
1440
1189

1676
1356
1688
1303

6.8%

10.2%

7.8%

7.8%
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Table 2: Distribution of education among A8 immigrants after 2004 in Ireland and the
UK
authors
country
lower secondary
upper secondary
third-level

Barrett & Duffy (2008) Dustmann et al. (2009)
Ireland
UK
11.1%
11.9%
61%
56.1%
28.2%
32%
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Table 3: OLS, weighted with sampling weights. Men and women - private sector. Dependent variable: log(real wage)

VARIABLES

Emigration rate

A: interaction region*year
(1)
(2)
(3)
all
interaction
interaction
male
male*married
0.657**

0.390

0.389

0.673**

0.406

0.411

[0.2786]

[0.3549]

[0.3377]

[0.2752]

[0.3147]

[0.3360]

0.774**

1.115**

0.776***

1.118***

[0.3222]

[0.3897]

[0.3191]

[0.3853]

Emigration * Male
Emigration * married
Emigration * married * male
Male
Married
Children
Agglomeration

-0.336

-0.3821

[0.4498]

[0.4443]

-1.057*

-1.043*

[0.5700]

[0.5698]

0.168***

0.147***

0.144***

0.166***

0.146***

0.143***

[0.0184]

[0.0197]

[0.0203]

[0.0184]

[0.0197]

[0.0206]

0.522***

0.524***

0.549***

0.524***

0.527***

0.552***

[0.0252]

[0.0251]

[0.0293]

[0.0249]

[0.0248]

[0.0290]

-0.036***

-0.036***

-0.033***

-0.036***

-0.035***

-0.032***

[0.0110]

[0.0110]

[0.0110]

[0.0109]

[0.0109]

[0.0110]

0.381***

0.380***

0.381***

0.379***

0.378***

0.380***

[0.0232]

[0.0232]

[0.0231]

[0.0228]

[0.0228]

[0.0227]

0.009

0.007

0.012

[0.0821]

[0.0821]

[0.0824]

0.610*

0.614*

0.622*

[0.3160]

[0.3159]

[0.3165]

log(exports)
log(gdp per cap.)
log(fdi stocks)

Year Dummies
Education Dummies
Experience Group FE
Region Dummies
Interaction
Region*Year
Observations
Adjusted R2

B: Controls FDI, Trade, GDP
(4)
(5)
(6)
all
interaction
interaction
male
male*married

0.024

0.024

0.025

[0.0164]

[0.0165]

[0.0165]

yes
yes
yes
no
yes

yes
yes
yes
no
yes

yes
yes
yes
no
yes

yes
yes
yes
yes
no

yes
yes
yes
yes
no

yes
yes
yes
yes
no

9970
0.3669

9970
0.3674

9970
0.3681

9970
0.3663

9970
0.3667

9970
0.3675

Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Marginal effects of emigration on wages for different groups, results from table
3. P-values in brackets.
All

A: interaction region*year
0.6568**

Women
Men

B: controls FDI, export, trade
0.6732**

(0.0192)

(0.0153)

0.3902

0.4061

(0.2180)

(0.1982)

1.1647***

1.1182***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

Women, unmarried

0.3895

0.4109

(0.2500)

(0.2227)

Women, married

-0.0532

0.0288

(0.4934)

(0.4411)

Men, unmarried

1.5047***

1.5293***

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

0.1109***

0.0002***

(0.0006)

(0.0003)

Men, married
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Table 5: Robustness checks. Marginal effects of emigration on wages for different groups.
P-values in brackets.
All

a)
0.3396
(0.3415)

(0.0827)

(0.0342)

(0.0035)

(0.0288)

Women

0.6835

0.2352

0.3572

0.2640

0.6301*

Men

d)
0.4517***

e)
0.8471**

(0.8322)

(0.4968)

(0.2630)

(0.2443)

(0.0832)

0.9420***

1.108***

0.9051***

1.6341***

(0.0006)

(0.0047)

(0.0002)

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

0.1042

0.2030

0.3509

0.2970

0.5537*

(0.7587)

(0.5931)

(0.3071)

(0.2095)

(0.1355)

-0.2357

0.0616

0.0297

-0.0934

0.7490

(0.7410)

(0.8657)

(0.5674)

(0.4171)

(0.2232)

1.3518***

1.2050***

1.4452***

1.0361***

2.1384***

(0.0002)

(0.0015)

(0.0001)

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

-0.0407***

0.0862***

-0.0471***

0.0524***

0.9438***

(0.0013)

(0.0064)

(0.0006)

(0.0019)

(0.0005)

Women, married

Men, married

c)
0.6032**

0.9910***

Women, unmarried

Men, unmarried

b)
0.4929*

a) Emigration rates of other cells included (section 5.2.5)
b) experience included as a continuous variable (section 5.2.6)
c) interaction education group * year (section 5.2.7)
d) 2-year experience cells (section 5.2.6)
e) 10-year experience cells (section 5.2.6)
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C

Figures

Figure 1: Emigrant shares after EU accession: number of work permits in the UK and
Ireland from 2004-2007 divided by the number of employed people in the source country
in 2003. Source: Eurostat.

Figure 2: Number of Lithuanian emigrants to the UK and Ireland, measured by registration for work permits, i.e. PPS and NINo numbers, 2002-2007. Sources: Irish Department
of Social and Family Affairs, UK Department for Work and Pensions

35000
30000
25000
20000
PPS
15000
NINo
10000
5000
0
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

41

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

41

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 539 [2011]

Figure 3: Lithuania: real GDP per capita, real average wages, unemployment. Source:
Statistics Lithuania. 2002=100.
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Figure 4: Scatter: wages and emigration rates for different groups (male and female,
married and unmarried. Source: own calculations.)
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Figure 5: Wage increases for different groups, 2002-2006, 2005=100. Source: own calculations, based on the Lithuanian HBS.

Figure 6: Gross fixed capital formation in million Litas. Sources: IMF International
Financial Statistics
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